Any worthwhile society requires an efficient and effective legal system. A healthy legal system requires great law libraries. This is particularly true of common law legal systems. It is as true today as it has been in the past. Great law libraries are the treasuries of a legal system. They are the warehouse where we find the law. They are also where we collate, catalogue, index and digest the sources of our and other systems of law.

Our ability to obtain access to those sources is being transformed by technology. The forward march of technology has not, however, reduced the importance of law libraries. It has instead dramatically increased the quantity and quality of information which is now regarded as indispensable in order to educate and train the lawyers who will be responsible for teaching, drafting, practicing, interpreting and applying the law.

It is a cause for celebration that the Squire has already been transformed. It celebrates its centenary in the new Sir Norman Foster Law Faculty Building that provides a magnificent contemporary setting in which to meet the challenges it now faces. I did not know the Cockerell Building before it was gloriously refurbished by it new owners, but I must confess I was surprised when an eminent lawyer and politician who is a graduate of this University assured me that in his day it was not called the Squire but the Squalor. I suspect this disrespect for a venerable building was an attempt to justify the fact that he had failed to benefit to the extent that he would/should have if he had spent more time in the Squire.

Certainly there can be no excuse for not regarding the new quarters as an ideal space for supporting research and teaching. It is a centre of excellence. I have to admit there is one respect in which it undoubtedly puts the Bar Library at the RCJ in the shade. The librarian there describes how members of the public and tourists regularly traipse up the grand staircase leading to the Bar Library only to be disappointed when they arrive to find no liquid refreshments. I am assured by my judicial assistant that excellence at the Squire extends to Nadia's in the basement where the lemon drizzle cakes and florentines are worthy of a detour.

Libraries have to evolve to meet the needs of their readers. Constitutions have to evolve to meet the needs of their citizens. A virtue of our being one of the three developed nations that does not have a written constitution, is that our constitution has always been capable of evolving as the needs of society change. The evolution can be incremental in a way which would be difficult if we had a written constitution. But flexibility comes at a price. We have never had the protection that a written constitution can provide for institutions that have a fundamental role to play in society. One of those institutions is a legal system that is effective, efficient and independent. A democratic society, pledged to the rule of law, would be deeply flawed without such a legal system.

So far we have coped successfully without a written constitution. That we entered the 21st century without there being more of a clamour for our constitutional arrangements to be reduced into writing is a situation in which we can take genuine pride. It reflects our national culture. It suggests we have benefited from a tradition of mutual respect, restraint and co-operation between the three arms of Government. Of course there have been times of tension, but with good sense and good will on all sides they have been successfully managed. This was made easier not because of the separation of powers, but because of the absence of the separation of powers.

The time may have been long past when Lord Chief Justices were, like Mansfield and Ellenborough, members of the cabinet, but still strong links continue to exist between the different arms of Government. Key examples have been the dual role of the Law Lords as judges and parliamentarians and the unique position of the Lord Chancellor as a member of the executive and head of the judiciary. There was also the long tradition of combining a successful career at the bar with an equally successful political career and then both careers culminating in a career as a judge. Good relations between parliament, the executive and the judiciary were enhanced because judges had extensive experience, and therefore an understanding, of politics, parliament and, not infrequently, government.

Such a background is not available to the English and Welsh judiciary today. But the advantages that come from such experience are not yet lost entirely. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, a former head of the judiciary of

Scotland, has experience of all these areas and combines this with a career as an academic; all achieved at an astonishingly early age.

The scale of recent change is illustrated by the fact that in 1960 25% of the members of the Commons were barristers and in 2001 the percentage was 5.2%. Despite this fall, the bar is still well-represented in government.

I mentioned that our ability to cope without a written constitution has depended on our tradition of mutual respect, restraint and co-operation. Many examples of self-restraint can be given, but it will probably suffice if I give one. It is Parliament's responsibility to legislate. The task of the court is to interpret that legislation. Interpretation is given an extended and novel meaning by the Human Rights Act. By enacting section 3 Parliament has placed judges under a duty to interpret legislation in a manner that is, as far as possible, Convention compliant. But the courts should not treat section 3 as a licence to intrude into Parliament's role. As Lord Hope said:

"the rule is only a rule of interpretation. It does not entitle the judges to act as legislators".

Our ability to manage very well, thank you, without one of those written constitutions which we so generously drafted for our former colonies, was probably also assisted by the fact that, as Dr Robert Stevens points out; with the exception of the 17th century:

"Traditionally the growth of the English Constitution has been organic, the rate of change glacial." [The English Judges; Their Role in the Changing Constitution]

By contrast, during the lifetime of this Government, prior to 12 June, there had been already a torrent of constitutional changes. Let me remind you; the removal of the hereditary peers from the House of Lords, devolution, the incorporation into domestic law of the European Convention on Human Rights and the creation of a unified courts administration.

This is by no means the whole story. There is hardly an institution performing functions of a public nature which has not been the subject of change. The changes have had an impact on the way in which our constitution operates. They have been introduced in separate legislation, but little attention has been paid to their cumulative effect.

It is against that background that the changes announced by the Government on 12 June last year have to be considered. The question that has to be asked is whether as part of the process of change we are paying sufficient attention to retaining or replacing the checks upon which, in the past, the delicate balance of our constitution has depended. Initially, the announcement may not have been seen as being of great significance. Certainly, the Government did not appreciate its significance because, if they had, it would have been announced in a different way. It was apparently seen by Government as a reform capable of being achieved by a press release.

During this administration, the office of Lord Chancellor has accumulated greater power than at any time in its history (apart from, possibly, the time of Cardinal Wolsey). So much so, that it was felt no longer appropriate for the department to be under the control of a member of the House of Lords rather than the Commons. An indication of the scale of the department is given by the fact that its annual budget is now around £3.5billion.

What had been seriously underestimated was the significance of the removal of the Lord Chancellor. It had not been appreciated sufficiently that the Lord Chancellor played a pivotal role in co-ordinating the three arms of Government. Nor had sufficient attention been paid to the fact that, because of his membership of the Cabinet, the Lord Chancellor was able to act as a lightening conductor at times of high tension between the executive and the judiciary.

However, if this was not appreciated last June, I accept that it is appreciated now. In the Constitutional Reform Bill introduced in the House of Lords last week, the Government has sought to put in place mechanisms to redress the deficit that could result from the proposed changes. The Bill is remarkable, in

my experience, in that it consists of 212 pages (relatively modest by today's standards) of which the Schedules take up all but 37 pages. An examination of their provisions demonstrates just how extensive are the tendrils of the Lord Chancellor's powers and the scale of the redistribution of those powers that will be necessary if the office is abolished. It also demonstrates the scale of the task that had to be performed within a very short time.

Apart from the scale of the change, what is the importance of the proposals? To a non-lawyer they may not seem to be of particular significance. What is the difference between a Lord Chancellor and a Secretary of State, the man on the Clapham Omnibus could, with reason, ask. After all, that engagingly friendly and cheerful chappie, Lord Falconer, seems to be quite happy playing both roles.

Over recent years, recognition of the importance of the rule of law and the significance of the independence of the judiciary has increased dramatically. One of the most important of the judiciary's responsibilities is to uphold the rule of law, since it is the rule of law which prevents the Government of the day from abusing its powers. Ultimately, it is the rule of law which stops a democracy descending into an elected dictatorship. To perform its task, the judiciary has to be, and seen to be, independent of government. Unless the public accepts that the judiciary are independent, they will have no confidence in the honesty and fairness of the decisions of the courts.

How successfully the Lord Chancellor performed the task of protecting the judiciary is controversial. What is not controversial is that the judiciary were content that he should have this role until 12 June, because, by convention, he was Head of the Judiciary and accepted the responsibility of being the protector of the judiciary. Personally I was on record as being in favour of the retention of the office. I set out my views in these terms five years ago:

"As a member of the Cabinet, he (the Lord Chancellor) can act as an advocate on behalf of the courts and the justice system. He can explain to his colleagues in the Cabinet the proper significance of a decision which they regard as being distasteful in consequence of an application for judicial review. He can, as a member of the Government, ensure that the courts are properly resourced. On the other hand, on behalf of the Government, he can explain to the judiciary the realities of the political situation and the constraints on the resources which they must inevitably accept.

As long as the Lord Chancellor is punctilious in keeping his separate roles distinct, the separation of powers is not undermined and the justice system benefits immeasurably. The justice system is better served by having the head of the judiciary at the centre of Government than it would be by having its interests represented by a Minister of Justice who would lack these other roles." [H.Woolf 'Judicial Review - the tensions between the executive and the judiciary' (1998) 114 LQR 579]

I would add that having a Lord Chancellor was very comfortable for the judiciary. They could avoid the chore of having to shoulder all the administrative tasks that are performed by the Lord Chancellor and his department on their behalf. If and when the Office is abolished, a great burden of administration is going to descend on the Lord Chief Justice in particular and the judiciary in general. What is more, when things go wrong there will be no Lord Chancellor to take the blame.

However, since the 12 June, I have personally, with reluctance, joined those who say the Lord Chancellor can no longer play his traditional role as Head of the Judiciary unless his responsibilities are significantly reduced. The reasons for my conversion include:

1. The scale of the Lord Chancellor's responsibilities as a spending Minister mean the office has become increasingly politically-charged.
2. His involvement in criminal justice, tribunals and asylum are at times inconsistent with his role as Head of the Judiciary.
3. There are an increasing number of occasions on which there are conflicts between his ministerial interests and those of the judiciary.
4. The Department now has three Ministers in addition to the Lord Chancellor and two Permanent Secretaries. The junior ministers do not see themselves as mini-Lord Chancellors or as being subject to the restraints that, by convention, apply to this role. They are, and see themselves as being,

ministers having main-line departmental responsibilities.

5. The system of appointments is, in any event, in need of fundamental reform. Not because it was not appointing excellent judges; that it does so, is not in dispute. But the current system is finding it almost impossible to appoint judges and, in particular, silks in a manner which meets the existing Judicial Appointments Commission's standards of objectivity. The paper-trails are unsatisfactory. The process is insufficiently based on verifiable criteria.
6. Finally, I have reservations as to whether there is any way of putting the clock back once you have had a Secretary of State and a Lord Chancellor; a combination of roles that I regard as being wholly inconsistent one with the other. I also have doubts whether it would be possible now to restore the special culture that needs to exist if the Lord Chancellor is to successfully combine his different and conflicting responsibilities.

It is becoming increasing clear that the independence of the judiciary requires increased statutory protection. The Act of Settlement, whose third centenary was a cause for celebration, is still the principal statutory protection. The remainder of the protection is dependent upon insecure conventions and understandings. For example, a letter passing between myself and Lord Irvine recording the need for my consent, is the only brake on the Lord Chancellor's power to discipline judges. There are many ways in which, consciously or unconsciously, the Department could give directions to Court Service staff which result in the courts becoming a tool of Government policy. In the setting of targets for the courts, pressure can be placed on the Court Service to meet certain policy objectives - perhaps giving early hearings for street-crimes - at the expense of other waiting cases. The only impediment to this sort of interference is the clear acknowledgement that 'listing' is a judicial function even if, in practice, listing is performed by civil servants.

The first event that made the need for more statutory protection clear was an attempt to transfer, without consultation, responsibility for the Court Service from the Lord Chancellor's Department to the Home Office as part of a Government reshuffle. The attempt was only frustrated at the last minute with the help of the judiciary. It was disturbing that - at that time - it was not appreciated within government that it was inappropriate for the department that most frequently had to defend proceedings for judicial review in the courts and that had lead responsibility for criminal justice policy to be in charge of what should be seen as an impartial Court Service.

Then there was the announcement of 12 June which clearly indicated an extraordinary lack of appreciation of the significance of what was being proposed. This was followed, shortly after 12 June and, again, without consultation, by the transfer of the Court Service from the Lord Chancellor to the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. This last action could well have been due to oversight, but it demonstrates there is a lack of appreciation of the significance of the independence of the judiciary in the corridors of government.

Having been confronted with the 12 June proposals, the reaction of the judiciary was that, whether the proposals were implemented or not, the judiciary should strive for a new constitutional settlement, recorded in legislation, that would protect as many interests of the judiciary as possible. In our response to the consultation papers we drew attention to the need for a public debate.

Irrespective of whether there is a Lord Chancellor and an impressive new Supreme Court (if possible, purpose-built to the quality of the Squire), the position of the judiciary has been demonstrated to be far too exposed.

I am relieved that the Lord Chancellor and I have achieved a concordat and that this is now in the public domain, a document recording our agreement having been lodged, earlier this year, in the libraries of both Houses of Parliament. I believe the concordat provides an appropriate constitutional framework for the future relationship between the Government and the judiciary. It will ensure that the judiciary comes of age and takes on responsibility for those features of the relationship that are critical to its future well-being. It is important to emphasise that the judiciary's concern with protecting its independence is so that it can fulfil its responsibility to the public. The concordat that has been agreed has not been designed to exclude the legislature and the executive from having any responsibility for the justice system. On the contrary, if the Bill is examined, it will be seen that many of its provisions involve shared responsibility. If the legislation is

implemented, it will, however, require a radical overhaul of the manner in which the judiciary organises itself. The implementation of the concordat will be the type of consensual constitutional evolution that could, for the time being, postpone the need to resort to the less flexible alternative of a written constitution.

Subject to some amendments which the Lord Chancellor has already agreed to make, the Constitutional Reform Bill reflects the concordat. The judiciary, as a whole, are satisfied that, if the concordat is implemented, the judiciary's independence will be protected. It will not be protected in the same way as it has in the past by a Lord Chancellor, but it is my judgment that the protection of the 'package' as a whole will mean that there need be no concern that the new arrangements threaten the future independence of the judiciary. The package also seeks to ensure that the accountability of the judiciary, since accountability must accompany independence.

There are to be new bodies with primary responsibility for appointments and discipline. In both there will be, for the first time, a role for non-lawyers. The Secretary of State will still have a role, but his role will be limited to acting upon the recommendations of the two bodies. Unlike the Lord Chancellor, he will not be in charge, but he will have sufficient responsibility to enable him to answer for the bodies to Parliament.

In some jurisdictions, the judiciary are provided with the resources to run the courts. It may be argued that it is only where this happens that true independence of the court system is possible. However, our judiciary have not, as yet, the experience to enable them to run a court system. Accordingly, the Secretary of State is to be under a statutory duty to ensure that there are efficient and effective systems to support the business of the courts in England and Wales. But the concordat provides for the judiciary to be represented in decision-making as to the resourcing of the Unified Court Agency and the Department by way of representation on the Boards of both bodies. In this way, the judiciary will, for the first time, have an early input into the preparation of funding bids and the allocation of resources that will enable them to have a genuine influence on the outcome. The partnership that has developed over the last twenty years or so between the judiciary and administrators is not only being maintained, but developed. Thus the Secretary of State's responsibility for the efficient and effective administration of the court system will be exercised in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice. Within the framework of the court system, it will be the Lord Chief Justice who will be responsible for the posting and roles of individual judges.

While the Chief Justice is the recipient named in the Bill for many functions previously performed by the Lord Chancellor, he is to be in a position to delegate those powers. The Lord Chief Justice must continue to function as a judge, so there will be a number of other judges of different levels of seniority who will provide leadership. Their appointment will fall to the Lord Chief Justice, but he will act either with the concurrence or in the consultation with the Secretary of State depending on the nature of the post.

The Secretary of State will have the responsibility for determining the framework governing the appointment of judges to the numerous committees, boards and similar bodies on which they now sit, but it will be the Chief Justice who determines which individual judges should be appointed to those bodies. Usually rules will be made by the relevant Rule Committee, with the Secretary of State having the power to approve or disallow those rules. Where no rule committee exists, the Chief Justice will make the rules with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Appointments of the non-judicial members of the rules committees will be made by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, while judicial members will be appointed by the Lord Chief Justice, after consultation with the Secretary of State.

Practice directions will be made by the Lord Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The education and training of the judiciary will be the responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice, but the Secretary of State will be responsible for providing the resources.

If you were to undertake the laborious task (I would not recommend you to do so) of studying in detail the schedules to the Bill, you would find that the 700 or so statutory provisions which name the Lord Chancellor have been divided between the Secretary of State and LCJ in a manner which reflects the divisions of responsibility to which I have just referred. Today, we cannot say whether these arrangements will be accepted by Parliament but if they are, this will be a highly satisfactory outcome.

So far, I have said nothing about the proposal which has probably attracted most attention from the public. That is, the proposal for a new Supreme Court separate and independent from the House of Lords. On this subject, the judiciary do not speak with one voice in the same way as they do on the reforms made necessary by the abolition of the office of the Lord Chancellor.

It is intended that the new court shall have very much the same jurisdiction as the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords has at present, save that it will also deal with the devolution issues which are, at present, primarily dealt with by the Law Lords in the Privy Council. This means that, though called a Supreme Court, it will not, in fact, be a supreme court. Except in relation to Community Law and in respect of devolution issues, the new court will be subordinate to the will of Parliament as expressed in legislation and will have no jurisdiction to hear Scottish criminal appeals. Among the Supreme Courts of the world, our Supreme Court will, because of its more limited role, be a poor relation. We will be exchanging a first class Final Court of Appeal for a second class Supreme Court.

The reason for having a Final Court of Appeal separate from the House of Lords is largely symbolic. However, symbols can have unexpected results. Separating the House of Lords in its legislative capacity from its activities as the Final Court of Appeal, could act as a catalyst causing the new court to be more proactive than its predecessor. This could lead to tensions. Although the Law Lords involvement in the legislative chamber is limited, the very fact that they are members of the legislature does provide them with an insight and understanding of the workings of Parliament to a greater extent than will be possible if they are no longer part of the House of Lords. The Scots are nervous about the change proposed and not supportive of it. We should pay particular attention to their concerns, in view of the proposal that the Supreme Court should deal with devolution issues.

There is also the question of the resources that will be required to establish and run the new Court. I am particularly unhappy about the suggestion that running costs will be recouped by imposing a surcharge on court fees. Those fees are, in my judgment, high enough already. In addition, I want to know (and I do not know at present) whether court fees in Scotland and Northern Ireland are also going to contribute to the new Court.

These worries do not cause me to be wholly hostile to the idea of a new Supreme Court. However, if I had a vote on the subject, I would be in favour of deferring a decision, until I knew, first of all, the building which it is intended the Supreme Court should occupy and, secondly, the method by which the other (non-judicial) members of the House of Lords will be appointed. If they are all to be elected, then it is unlikely that the law Lords can remain part of the membership. This would resolve the issue for me. Certainly, it would make the presence of a Chief Justice as a member of the House incongruous. The Appellate Committee's accommodation and support has improved since I was a full-time Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Certainly, I see no reason to rush into establishing the Supreme Court before its new home has been decided upon. To push ahead now, despite the many reservations which have been expressed, would, it seems to me, be inconsistent with the desirability of achieving constitutional change by consensus.

If the Constitutional Reform Bill becomes law in its present form, we cannot take the continued individual, or collective, independence of the judiciary for granted. Fairly recent events cause me to still have real concerns for the future. The Government has made no secret of the fact that in the future the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs is likely to be a member of the Commons and could well be a non-lawyer. Particularly because of a perceived need for a joined-up approach to criminal justice, I am worried about the becoming a subsidiary of the Home Office or unable to compete with the dominance of the Home Office. The result could be the Home Office being in a position to dictate the agenda for the courts which would not accord with the need for independence. Perhaps I am unduly worried since I am conscious that one of my predecessors, Lord Hewitt, had similar fears in the 1920s. I hope my fears are unjustified, but it is worrying when changes are advocated without apparent appreciation of their significance.

Another cause of the same concern is the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Bill, which has just completed its passage through the Commons and is now about to proceed to the Lords. The Bill seeks to establish a single tier of appeal against Home Office decisions in relation to asylum and immigration matters to replace the two tiers which currently exist.

However, it is not this aspect of the Bill, worrying though it is, upon which I wish to focus now. What I want to focus upon is clause 11 of the Bill. This clause is undoubtedly unique in the lengths to which it goes in order to prevent the courts from adjudicating on whether the new appeal tribunal has acted in accordance with the law. As the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee stated in its report of 26 February:

"An ouster clause as extensive as the one suggested in the Bill is without precedent. As a matter of constitutional principle some form of higher judicial oversight of lower tribunals and executive decisions should be retained. This is particularly true when life and liberty may be at stake."

The provision has to be read to appreciate the lengths to which the Government has gone to try and exclude the possibility of intervention by the courts. Extensive consultation took place with myself and other members of the judiciary before the Bill was introduced. We recognised that there was a problem of abuse to be tackled. However, our advice was that a clause of the nature now included in the Bill was fundamentally in conflict with the rule of law and should not be contemplated by any government if it had respect for the rule of law.

We advised that the clause was unlikely to be effective and identified why. The result was that clause 11 was extended to close the loopholes we had identified, instead of being abandoned as we had argued. The only concession that appears to have been made to our representations has been to give the complainant the right to ask for an internal review. In addition, we argued that ouster was not necessary and that action could be taken which was more likely to be effective than an clause of this nature. Importantly, we pointed out that the danger of the proposed ouster clause was that it could bring the judiciary, the executive and the legislature into conflict. Apparently this was of little concern.

Since the Bill was introduced, the clause has been criticised by distinguished constitutional lawyers and, last week, by Lord Mackay the former Lord Chancellor. What makes the provision even more objectionable, is that the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 introduced a form of statutory review by the High Court on the papers which is extremely expeditious (taking a few weeks rather than months) and which gives every indication of being successful. The judiciary recommended this new procedure and co-operated in its introduction to prevent abuse of the protection afforded by the courts. Because the process is so speedy, there is no great advantage to be gained from making abusive applications and this is one of the reasons why the number of statutory reviews has, so far, been relatively modest.

The Constitutional Affairs Committee recommends that *“no change should be made until there has been more experience of the impact”* of this initiative. I agree.

In discussions which have taken place between the judiciary and the Government, there have been attempts to justify the clause, but these are specious and unsatisfactory. It is particularly regrettable that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State should find it acceptable to have responsibility for promoting this clause.

I understand that the Lord Chancellor has recently said that the clause is not intended to exclude habeas corpus. In view of the language of the clause this surprises me. It also surprises me because, if the clause does not exclude habeas corpus, then I would have thought it inevitable that it will, in practice, lead to an increase in delay. This is because the right to apply for habeas corpus does not involve the safeguard of a requirement as to leave. It also surprises me that the Government does not see it as inconsistent to promote a clause designed to exclude the courts from performing their basic role of protecting the rule of law at the same time that it is introducing the present constitutional reforms. Their actions are totally inconsistent and I urge the Government to think again as the cross-party Constitutional Affairs Committee recommends. There is still time. The implementation of the clause would be a blot on the reputation of the Government and undermine its attempts to be a champion of the rule of law overseas. I trust the clause will have short-shrift in the Lords, but, even then, the attempt to include it in legislation could result in a loss of confidence in the commitment of the Government to the rule of law.

I am not over-dramatising the position if I indicate that, if this clause were to become law, it would be so inconsistent with the spirit of mutual respect between the different arms of government that it could be the

catalyst for a campaign for a written constitution. Immigration and asylum involve basic human rights. What areas of government decision-making would be next to be removed from the scrutiny of the courts? What is the use of courts, if you cannot access them? It was for this reason that a prison governor was found to be in contempt for interfering with a prisoner's access to the courts [Raymond -v- Honey]. Professor Sir William Wade, who is alas not here tonight because of illness, describes the right of access to the courts as "the critical right" in the great text book he edits with Doctor Forsyth. The response of the government and the House of Lords to the chorus of criticism of clause 11 will produce the answer to the question of whether our freedoms can be left in their hands under an unwritten constitution.

The judiciary are going to be faced with change on an unprecedented scale. These changes are not confined to the proposed constitutional reforms which have been the prime subject for me tonight. They include judges taking on a much more central role in the management of civil, family and criminal litigation. A spirit of partnership between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive is essential if the judiciary are to meet the changing needs of society. Nothing can be more important than that spirit should not be damaged. Our judiciary today are not only as well-qualified as they have ever been to meet the challenges that confront them. They are also now better organised than they have been in the past. I am confident that, whatever may be the decision of Parliament, the judiciary will continue to seek to uphold the rule of law to the best of their ability. They hope for the support of the government and Parliament in their efforts.

That brings me to the end of the comments I wish to make. You are fortunate that I am recovering from a cold otherwise I would have treated you to a fine rendition of Happy Birthday to the Squire Library. As it is, I will confine myself to saying "Many Happy Returns Squire on a centenary of great achievements. We look forward with confidence to your next century".