Mazepin v Council (Interim relief - Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in respect of Russian actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine - Order) [2023] EUECJ T-743/22

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	Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> Mazepin v Council (Interim relief - Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in respect of Russian actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine - Order) [2023] EUECJ T-743/22_CO (22 December 2023) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2023/T74322_CO.html Cite as: [2023] EUECJ T-743/22_CO

(Interim relief – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of Russian actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Application for interim measures – Partial inadmissibility – Prima facie case – Urgency – Weighing up of interests)

Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, T. Marembert and A. Bass, lawyers,

Council of the European Union, represented by J. Rurarz and P. Mahnič, acting as Agents,

Republic of Latvia, represented by J. Davidoviča and K. Pommere, acting as Agents,

having regard to the order of 3 October 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R III and T‑743/22 R IV, not published),

further to the hearing on the application for interim measures on 5 December 2023,

1 By his application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, seeks, inter alia, under the same conditions as those provided for in the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), in essence, (i) suspension of the operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3), in so far as they concern the applicant (together, ‘the September 2023 measures’), and of the decision contained in the letter of the Council of the European Union of 15 September 2023 to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures.

3 The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

4 On 9 March 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 31), by which the applicant’s name was added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended.

5 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was added to the list in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6), as amended.

6 On 14 September 2022, in view of the continuing actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149), by which it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2014/145, amending the reasons for the inclusion of his name on that list.

7 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was maintained on the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 with the same amendment to the reasons referred to in the preceding paragraph.

8 On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/572, amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134), by which it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2014/145, amending the reasons for his inclusion on that list and his identifying information.

9 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571, implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was maintained on the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, with the same amendments to the reasons and identifying information as those referred to in the preceding paragraph.

10 On 5 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20), by which it amended, in particular, the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 to include immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefiting from leading businesspersons operating in Russia.

11 On the same date, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1), in order to give effect to the amendments made by Decision 2023/1094.

12 On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted Decision 2023/1767, by which it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2014/145.

13 The reasons for including the applicant’s name in the list of persons, entities and bodies covered are now the following:

‘Nikita Mazepin is the son of Dmitry Mazepin, owner and former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem. He was a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, sponsored by Dmitry Mazepin through Uralchem’s subsidiary, Uralkali. His foundation “We compete as one” is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali. He is also associated with his father through joint business interests in the company Hitech GP, which was partly owned by Dmitry Mazepin through Uralkali and whose objective is to benefit Nikita Mazepin’s career as a motorsport driver, and which is now owned by a common business associate of the two men.

He is an immediate family member benefitting from and associated with his father, Dmitry Mazepin, a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

14 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation 2023/1765, by which the applicant’s name was maintained, with the same statement of reasons, on the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014.

15 On 15 September 2023, the Council sent a letter to the applicant to inform him of its decision to maintain his name on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures.

16 By his second statement of modification, lodged on 20 September 2023 in Case T‑743/22, the applicant requested the Court to annul the September 2023 measures, in so far as they concerned him, and the decision contained in the letter of the Council of 15 September 2023.

17 By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 2 October 2023, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which he claims that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should:

– order, under the same conditions as those provided for in the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), suspension of operation of the September 2023 measures in so far as they maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures in accordance with Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 and of the decision contained in the letter of the Council of 15 September 2023;

– grant any other appropriate interim measures which the judge hearing the application for interim measures may deem necessary, in the light of the circumstances, in order to prevent the serious harm the applicant has already suffered from being further aggravated, as well as to guarantee that the applicant be put in a position effectively to avail himself of the rights granted by the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406);

– order the Council to publish, in the same series of the Official Journal of the European Union where the applicant’s re-listing is published, a note clearly indicating that that re-listing is subject to suspension under the same conditions as those provided for in the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406);

– order the Council to inform the judge hearing the application for interim measures of the measures adopted;

– order, under Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and with immediate effect, suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures in so far as they concern him and of the decision contained in the letter of the Council of 15 September 2023 under the same conditions as those laid down in the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), until the date of the order terminating the interlocutory proceedings;

18 In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Court Registry on 20 October 2023, the Council contends that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should:

– dismiss the application for interim measures as inadmissible in so far as it concerns the letter of 15 September 2023;

– dismiss as inadmissible the application for any other ‘appropriate interim measures’ and for the publication, in the same series of the Official Journal of the European Union where the measures re-listing the applicant’s name have been published, of a note clearly indicating that that re-listing is subject to suspension;

19 It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12).

20 The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.

21 The judge hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim relief is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

22 In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

23 In the present case, it is appropriate to examine, first, the admissibility of some of the applicant’s heads of claim, next, the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case and, last, that of urgency.

The admissibility of the application for interim measures in so far as it seeks to obtain suspension of the operation of the letter of 15 September 2023 and any other appropriate interim measures

24 The Council contends that the applicant’s first head of claim, in so far as it seeks to obtain suspension of the operation of the decision contained in its letter of 15 September 2023, and his second head of claim should be rejected as inadmissible.

25 Regarding the letter of the Council of 15 September 2023, it must be stated that it is the measure whereby that institution communicated to the applicant, first, information relating to the maintenance, after review, of his name on the lists at issue, and, second, the grounds for that maintenance. It is therefore prima facie a purely informative measure, which, as such, is not capable of forming the subject matter of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2014, Alchaar v Council, T‑203/12, not published, EU:T:2014:602, paragraph 57 et seq.). The application for interim measures must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it seeks to obtain suspension of the operation of an alleged decision contained in the letter of 15 September 2023.

26 Regarding the applicant’s second head of claim, it must be recalled that the applicant seeks any other interim measure which the judge hearing the application for interim measures may deem necessary, in the light of the circumstances, in order to prevent the serious harm the applicant claims to have already suffered from being further aggravated, as well as to guarantee that the applicant be put in a position effectively to avail himself of the rights granted by the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406).

27 In that connection, it must be stated that the applicant does not provide any explanation to clarify his request sufficiently; that request is vague and imprecise. Without further details as to its subject matter, such a request does not meet the criteria laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, to which Article 156(5) of those rules refers. That head of claim is therefore inadmissible (see, to that effect, order of 12 February 1996, Lehrfreund v Council and Commission, T‑228/95 R, EU:T:1996:16, paragraph 58).

28 According to settled case-law, the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied where at least one of the pleas in law put forward by the applicant for interim measures in support of the main action appears, prima facie, not unfounded. That is the case where one of the pleas relied on reveals the existence of a major legal or factual disagreement whose solution is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination which cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures but must be the subject of the main proceedings (see, to that effect, orders of 3 December 2014, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P-R, EU:C:2014:2418, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 1 March 2017, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international, C‑512/16 P(R), not published, EU:C:2017:149, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

29 In order to determine whether the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied in the present case, it is necessary to carry out a prima facie examination of the substance of the complaints raised by the applicant in support of the main action and therefore to ascertain whether at least one of them is so weighty that it cannot be ruled out in the proceedings for interim measures (see order of 4 May 2020, Csordas and Others v Commission, T‑146/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:172, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

30 In the present case, in order to demonstrate that the September 2023 measures are, prima facie, unlawful, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

31 It is appropriate to begin by examining the third plea, by which the applicant claims, in essence, that the grounds for including his name on the lists at issue are not founded or supported by evidence, with the result that the Council made a manifest error of assessment, failed to discharge the burden of proof and breached his rights of defence.

32 More specifically, in the first place, the applicant claims that the company Uralkali, not Uralchem, was the sponsor of Haas F1 Team, his former employer, and that his father, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, whose name is also included on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures, was never the General Director of Uralkali. Thus, his father’s potential involvement in the conclusion of the sponsorship agreement between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team cannot be presumed, but should have been clearly established by the Council. However, nothing in the documentary basis communicated to this day establishes that his father had participated in, or had a decisive influence on, the decision-making process which led to the signing of the sponsorship agreement. Moreover, the evidence produced by the Council fails to establish that the applicant could not have obtained his seat as a driver in that team without that sponsorship. Lastly, the applicant alleges that the sponsorship agreement concluded with Haas F1 Team was, for Uralkali, a commercial transaction that was entirely justified from an economic point of view and that global fertiliser companies regularly sponsor sporting events and competitions.

33 In the second place, the applicant submits that the foundation ‘We compete as one’ is not set to be financed by Uralkali and that his father is not involved in such a funding decision.

34 In the third place, the applicant claims that nothing in the Council documents shows that he is associated with his father through joint business interests in the company Hitech GP or that he derives benefits from his father through that company.

36 In the first place, the Council contends that the applicant benefited from his father through the sponsorship agreement concluded between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team, in so far as he could not have obtained the seat as a driver on the team without the significant sponsorship provided by his father.

37 In the second place, the Council submits that the foundation ‘We compete as one’ founded and presided over by the applicant benefits from his father in various ways and pursues common interests with companies owned and effectively controlled by the applicant’s father.

38 In that context, the Council adds that, even if a direct sponsorship has not been granted until now, a mediatised promise of funding already constitutes a benefit for the foundation ‘We compete as one’, in so far as such a promise lends credibility to the foundation and attracts potential sponsors. In addition, new evidence has shown that, in June 2023, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, that foundation had organised a panel session moderated by the applicant, in which the new General Director of Uralchem allegedly participated. Moreover, the foundation entered into a partnership with Moscow State University, which signed a partnership agreement with Uralchem in June 2023 covering new educational projects. Last, the president and General Director of that foundation, holding that position until 31 May 2022, was and still is an adviser to the General Director of Uralchem.

39 In the third place, the Council submits that the applicant’s father held, until 2022, partial ownership rights of Hitech GP, directly or through Uralkali, and that he continues to control Hitech GP. Moreover, the applicant was employed by that company when he was a driver in the Formula 2 and 3 teams. Hitech GP, which has confirmed publicly that it plans to enter Formula 1 with its own team, is still closely associated with the applicant and his father. In particular, the applicant intends to be part of Hitech GP’s Formula 1 team.

40 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to case-law, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

41 In the present case, it must be stated that, having regard to the wording of the reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in the September 2023 measures and of the listing criteria as amended by Decision 2023/1094, the inclusion of the applicant’s name on those lists is now based on two criteria, that is to say, the association criterion laid down in Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) in fine of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and the criterion covering immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefiting from leading businesspersons operating in Russia, laid down in Article 1(1)(e) and Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. As is apparent from the reasons recalled in paragraph 13 above, the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue on account of the fact that he is an immediate family member benefiting from and associated with his father, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

42 In order to justify maintaining the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, in addition to the evidence previously provided in the context of the preceding interim proceedings, the Council provided files WK 8979/2023 INIT, WK 5142/2023 INIT, WK 5142/2023 ADD 1, WK 9510/2023 INIT and WK 9948/2023 INIT, containing publicly available information, namely links to websites, press articles and corresponding screenshots.

43 It must therefore be determined whether the applicant’s claims that the Council erred in its assessment in considering that there was a sufficiently solid factual basis which justified maintaining his name on the lists at issue are prima facie well founded.

44 To that end, in the first place, it is appropriate to examine the applicant’s argument that the Council does not show that, by the conclusion of the sponsorship agreement between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team, the applicant benefited from his father.

45 In that regard, it is apparent from the reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue that, as a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, he was sponsored by his father through Uralkali, a subsidiary of Uralchem.

46 That part of the reasons for listing relates to the fact that the applicant’s father, the owner and former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem and a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, had, through the sponsorship agreement concluded between Uralkali, a subsidiary of Uralchem, and Haas F1 Team, sponsored the activities of his son.

47 Furthermore, as found by the judge hearing the application for interim measures in the orders of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102, paragraph 46), and of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406, paragraph 64), the Council has substantiated to the requisite legal standard the fact that Uralkali concluded a sponsorship agreement with Haas F1 Team. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute that.

48 Nevertheless, the applicant submits, first, that the evidence provided by the Council does not establish that he would not have been able to obtain that driver’s seat within Haas F1 Team without the sponsorship agreement and, second, that that agreement was, for Uralkali, a commercial transaction which was entirely justified from an economic point of view and, in that regard, that it has not been established that that agreement runs counter to Uralkali’s interests.

49 Although it is accepted that Uralkali concluded a sponsorship agreement with Haas F1 Team, there are, at this stage, and in the light of the arguments put forward, reasons to doubt that the restrictive measures concerning the applicant are founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis and, in particular, that the files on which the Council based those measures are such as to substantiate the fact that the applicant benefits from his father through the sponsorship agreement. In other words, although the Council shows that Uralkali, a company linked to the applicant’s father, did in fact conclude that sponsorship agreement with Haas F1 Team, there are prima facie reasons to doubt that the conclusion of that agreement runs counter to the financial interests of Uralkali and that the applicant could not have obtained a seat as a driver in that team without that sponsorship.

50 Admittedly, some of the evidence produced by the Council suggests that the applicant benefited from the support of a company linked to his father to become a driver in the Formula 1 team or reflects negative assessments of his results as a Formula 1 driver. However, it is clear that item No 10 in file WK 9948/2023 INIT contains a positive assessment of his qualifications and experience to compete in Formula 1.

51 Moreover, it is apparent from the orders of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102, paragraph 49), and of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406, paragraph 67), that, first, the applicant achieved very good results in GP 3 (the former name of Formula 3) and in Formula 2 before being recruited to Formula 1 and, second, that the Council did not show that the applicant obtained the position of Formula 1 driver solely on account of his father’s financial support. The evidence submitted by the Council in the present interim proceedings cannot prima facie call into question those assessments.

52 In addition, at this stage and in the light of the arguments put forward, as stated in the orders of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102, paragraph 50), and of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406, paragraph 68), there are prima facie reasons to doubt that the evidence provided by the Council leads to the conclusion that the sponsorship between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team was tantamount to philanthropy or to a commercial transaction that ran counter to the economic interests of Uralkali and that that sponsorship did not benefit the two contracting parties.

53 In that regard, in paragraph 70 of its observations on the application for interim measures, the Council submits that the termination of the sponsorship agreement between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team immediately following the termination of the applicant’s contract with that team shows that the sponsorship had no link to the alleged benefits derived by that company from the sponsorship of a Formula 1 team. That argument appears, prima facie, to run counter to, specifically, items Nos 6 and 9 in file WK 1127/2023 INIT (order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council, T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406, paragraph 68), items Nos 12 to 15 in file WK 9510/2023, item No 3 in file WK 9948/2023 INIT and the declaration of the team concerned of 5 March 2022, referred to in paragraph 167 of the application for interim measures, from which it is apparent that the Haas team unilaterally terminated the sponsorship agreement.

54 Moreover, as noted in paragraph 50 of the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102), and paragraph 69 of the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), both Uralchem and Uralkali sponsored other sporting activities. More specifically, Uralchem was a long-term partner of the Russian Swimming Federation and Uralkali had been the sponsor of the organiser of the Formula 1 Russian Grand Prix.

55 In that context, the applicant adds, supported by examples, that other global fertiliser companies regularly sponsor sporting events or championships.

56 In those circumstances, it is appropriate to find that the evidence and arguments submitted by the applicant show that there is a major factual dispute whose solution is not immediately obvious, and call for a detailed examination by the Court in the context of the main action in order to determine whether there is a sufficiently solid factual basis for maintaining the name of the applicant on the lists in the annexes to the September 2023 measures.

57 In the second place, it must be borne in mind that the reasons in the September 2023 measures also state that ‘[the applicant’s] foundation “We compete as one” is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali’.

58 That part of the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue relates to the fact that the applicant’s father intended to finance his son’s foundation through Uralkali.

59 The applicant denies benefiting from his father through the foundation ‘We compete as one’ and claims that that foundation is not set to be financed either by Uralkali directly or through its funds. In any event, the Council did not show that his father was involved in that alleged financing of that foundation.

60 Although the Council acknowledges, in paragraph 95 of its observations on the application for interim measures, that the direct sponsorship of Uralkali has not been awarded until now, it notes that it is clear from several items of evidence, public declarations by the applicant and Uralkali representatives in particular, that the foundation ‘We compete as one’ had received assurances that it would be financed by Uralkali.

61 Admittedly, as also observed in paragraph 74 of the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), press articles forming part of the file present the foundation at issue as being the applicant’s foundation and set out information or declarations, including by the applicant himself, that that foundation will or could be financed through funds from Uralkali. However, the applicant stresses, correctly, that that evidence predates the creation of that foundation. That is also the case of the new evidence relied on by the Council, that is to say, item No 1 in file WK 8979/2023 INIT and items Nos 12 to 15 in file WK 9510/2023 INIT, which were published shortly after the termination of the sponsorship agreement between Haas F1 Team and Uralkali.

62 Moreover, prima facie, there is nothing in the file to suggest that the Haas team repaid Uralkali the costs incurred under the sponsorship agreement which had to be, as the case may be, made available to the future foundation, or that Uralkali did actually contribute to the financing of the foundation ‘We compete as one’ or, since the creation of that foundation, has renewed funding promises.

63 In addition, without there being any need at this stage to rule on their probative value, disputed by the Council, it must be stated that, in support of his line of argument, the applicant reproduces, in the application for interim measures, the declarations of the General Director of the foundation ‘We compete as one’ that the foundation has never benefited from Uralkali, nor is that general director aware of any such plans in the future, and the declarations of the General Director of Uralkali that that company has never provided any kind of financial support to the foundation since its creation.

64 It must further be stated that the Council’s argument that the declarations of funding of the foundation ‘We compete as one’ by Uralkali, which predate the creation of that foundation, constitute in themselves an advantage for the foundation does not appear prima facie to be substantiated.

65 Regarding the Council’s assertion in paragraph 96 of its observations on the application for interim measures that, in June 2023, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the foundation ‘We compete as one’ organised a panel session, which was moderated by the applicant and in which the new General Director of Uralchem participated, it must be observed that that event does not show prima facie that the applicant benefited from his father. More specifically, it is apparent from items Nos 1 to 3 in file WK 9510/2023 INIT and item No 19 in file WK 9948/2023 INIT that, first, the panel session at issue, which concerned the benefits and the place of sport in corporate life, was organised by the foundation in question, in partnership with the Managers Association, in the context of the 26th edition of an international business forum. Second, in addition to the General Director of Uralchem, other directors of large companies and the President of the Russian Triathlon Federation participated as speakers. Moreover, according to item No 2 in file WK 9510/2023 INIT, members of Uralchem and Uralkali were also due to participate in several other discussions during that forum over four days, during which those companies also ran booths.

66 In paragraph 97 of its observations on the application for interim measures, the Council submits that, in December 2022, the foundation ‘We compete as one’ partnered with Moscow State University, that that university signed a sponsorship agreement with Uralchem in June 2023 covering new educational projects and that, in the same month, that foundation stated that the athletes supported by the foundation would be able to attend an educational initiative at Moscow State University in the framework of a new cooperation.

67 However, the evidence relied on by the Council does not show prima facie that the sponsorship agreement concluded between Uralchem and Moscow State University can be regarded as an initiative taken to allow the applicant’s foundation to participate in a cooperative project with that university. It is apparent from items Nos 6 and 7 in file WK 9510/2023 INIT that Uralchem signed partnership agreements with several Russian universities in order to develop activities in scientific and engineering fields. According to those items, the educational projects from which the members of the foundation presided over by the applicant may benefit relate to various fields such as entrepreneurship, business management and marketing. Moreover, item No 6 in file WK 9510/2023 INIT contains a statement that the Uralchem company has, for many years, established cooperative projects with Moscow State University.

68 Regarding the Council’s argument that the President and General Director of the foundation ‘We compete as one’, who held that position until 31 May 2022, was and allegedly still is an adviser to the General Director of Uralchem, it is clear that that it is a past link and that there is nothing to show prima facie that there are still links of that nature between the foundation in question and Uralchem.

69 It follows from all the foregoing that the evidence and arguments submitted by the applicant show that there is a major factual dispute the resolution of which warrants a detailed examination in the context of the main action in order to determine whether maintaining the name of the applicant on the lists at issue has a sufficiently solid factual basis. The same applies to the Council’s argument that a broader context would show that the foundation ‘We compete as one’ benefits in various ways from companies owned and effectively controlled by Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin and pursues joint interests with those companies.

70 In the third place, it must be borne in mind that the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue further state that ‘he is also associated with his father through joint business interests in the company Hitech GP, which was partly owned by Dmitry Mazepin through Uralkali and whose objective is to benefit Nikita Mazepin’s career as a motorsport driver, and which is now owned by a common business associate of the two men.’

71 The applicant asserts that nothing in the Council’s evidence file shows that he is associated with his father through joint business interests in the company Hitech GP or that he benefits from his father through that company.

72 In that respect, it must be stated that, although certain items of evidence show that the applicant was employed by Hitech GP when that company was owned by his father or Uralkali, it is clear that there is nothing to suggest prima facie that his father currently owns shares in Hitech GP. That is also apparent from the wording of the reasons for inclusion recalled in paragraph 70 above and Annexes 43 and 44 to the application for interim measures. Moreover, the Council states, in paragraph 106 of its observations on the application for interim measures, that the shares held by the applicant’s father and by Uralkali were transferred shortly before restrictive measures were imposed against Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin.

73 The Council further claims that the applicant’s father continues to control the company Hitech GP despite the sale of his shares, that the applicant’s career remains linked to Hitech GP and that that company has publicly confirmed that it plans to enter Formula 1 with its own team.

74 However, the applicant claims that items Nos 5 and 6 in file WK 9948/2023 INIT merely set out unsubstantiated rumours that his father continues to control Hitech GP despite its change in ownership. It is clear that that argument does not appear, prima facie, to be entirely unfounded.

75 In addition, as the applicant claims, it is apparent from public sources that, in addition to the applicant, at least 90 racing drivers have, until now, competed for Hitech GP. In the circumstances recalled in paragraphs 72 and 74 above, the fact that the applicant’s career may remain linked to Hitech GP and that he may consider competing for that team does not show prima facie that he is associated with his father or benefits from him through Hitech GP.

76 In those circumstances, it is appropriate to find that the evidence and arguments submitted by the applicant show that there is a major factual dispute whose solution is not immediately obvious, and call for a detailed examination by the Court in the context of the main action in order to determine whether there is a solid factual basis for maintaining the name of the applicant on the lists at issue.

77 It is apparent from all the foregoing that, without prejudging the Court’s decision in the main action, the present plea appears to be prima facie not unfounded within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 28 above.

79 In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU judicature. To attain that objective, urgency must generally be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see, to that effect, order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

80 It is in the light of those criteria that it must be examined whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.

81 In the first place, in order to demonstrate the serious and irreparable nature of the damage alleged, the applicant claims that there is a significant risk, if the interim measures applied for are not granted, that he will be prevented from applying for a Schengen visa, which, together with the length of time that issuing such a visa would be likely to take, would lead to an inacceptable interruption of the effort taken to resume his professional career, with the result that any attempt to prevent irreparable damage from occurring would therefore be rendered practically futile.

82 In the second place, the applicant alleges that motor sport teams are obviously unwilling to enter into serious negotiations or, a fortiori, conclude contracts with a fully listed driver on the lists at issue and who does not have at least a derogation for his professional activities.

83 In the third place, the applicant claims that he will suffer serious and irreparable damage in his professional career as a Formula 1 driver if the interim measures are not granted. The applicant adds that he cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage to his professional career as a driver in other motor sport competitions, such as Formula 2 or Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters.

84 The Council maintains that the applicant has not demonstrated urgency. First, according to the Council, there is no causal link between the alleged damage and the restrictive measures at issue, which means that the suspension of the operation of those measures cannot offer the applicant protection against the type of damage he seeks to avoid. Second, the alleged damage is not quantified or supported by evidence, with the result that it is purely hypothetical and based on the occurrence of future and uncertain events. Third, in any event, the damage claimed by the applicant is purely pecuniary and is therefore reparable by way of an action for damages. Last, the applicant seeks protection of a right that, as a third-country national, he does not have within the EU legal order, that is to say, the right to enter and reside in the European Union.

85 In that regard, in the first place, it must be borne in mind that, in paragraph 75 of the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102), and paragraph 93 of the order of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), the President of the General Court has already stated that the damage claimed by the applicant, namely the loss of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships, is of a non-pecuniary nature.

86 In the second place, regarding the Council’s argument that there is no causal link between the effects produced by the September 2023 measures and the damage claimed by the applicant, it is true that the termination of the applicant’s contract by Haas F1 Team in March 2022 does not appear to be a consequence of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue but of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. However, it is clear that the applicant produces, as an annex to his application for interim measures, a letter, dated 22 September 2022, from a team participating, in particular, in the Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters championship. It is apparent from that letter that, despite the interest in the applicant’s application, he would not be recruited while restrictive measures were being imposed on him. The author of that letter adds that the applicant’s application could nevertheless be considered if those restrictive measures were lifted.

87 In addition, the applicant produced, as an annex to his application for interim measures, a letter dated 24 June 2023 from another motor sport team, regarding possible recruitment for the 2024 World Endurance Championship of the International Automobile Federation (‘FIA’). The author of that letter clarifies that he is open to providing the applicant with the necessary documentation for his visa application to travel to Italy. In that connection, it must be stated that, on that date, the President of the General Court had, by order of 5 April 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published), granted suspension on a temporary basis of the operation of the measures taken against the applicant that were then in force.

88 Moreover, during the hearing on the application for interim measures of 5 December 2023 and following that hearing, the applicant produced two letters from other motor sport teams, dated 29 November 2023 and 6 December 2023 respectively, which invited him to travel to Italy in order to negotiate his potential recruitment for two other championships. However, on the dates of those letters, suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures against the applicant had already been granted on a temporary basis by the President of the General Court in the order of 3 October 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R III and T‑743/22 R IV, not published).

89 The Council claims that the letter of 29 November 2023 referred to in paragraph 88 above is inadmissible, on the ground that it is out of time. Admittedly, in accordance with Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure, applications for interim measures must contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures. However, the letter at issue postdates the introduction of the application for interim measures. In addition, it does not remedy defects of the application for interim measures, but rather must be regarded as tantamount to additional information, in the same vein as a reply by one of the parties to a question put by the judge hearing the application for interim measures. It must therefore be held that those circumstances justify, in the present case, the late lodging of that item of evidence and that it is therefore admissible.

90 Moreover, suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures against the applicant, granted on a temporary basis by the order of 3 October 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R III and T‑743/22 R IV, not published), allowed the applicant to undergo a first series of medical examinations and training sessions, over the course of a week, in a specialised sports medicine facility in Italy.

91 It is apparent from the foregoing that suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures is necessary to make it possible for the applicant to pursue a career as a professional motor sport driver in championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union. It is therefore appropriate to find that the applicant has shown to the requisite standard that there is a causal link between the effects produced by the September 2023 measures and the damage claimed.

92 In the third place, regarding the seriousness of the damage claimed, it is worth noting that, without the requested suspension, the applicant would be deprived of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union until 15 March 2024, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1767.

93 The resulting damage to the applicant, in the absence of the suspension sought, may be characterised as particularly serious because it would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver in view of his age, the fact that he would not be able to train regularly in Formula 1 cars or similar cars in the meantime and the likelihood that he would not be able to renew his Super Licence after an interruption of more than three years, should the Court annul the September 2023 measures at the end of the main proceedings.

94 Admittedly, as observed by the Council, since the adoption of the orders of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102), and of 19 July 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published, EU:T:2023:406), the 2023 Formula 1 season has ended, the Formula 1 teams have recruited their main drivers for the 2024 season and the applicant is currently participating in the Asian Le Mans Series, which is taking place outside the European Union. However, as the applicant submits, negotiations to recruit other pilots, in particular for Formula 1 tests and for other championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union are still ongoing. It must also be stated that the last race of the Asian Le Mans Series is programmed for 11 February 2024, with the result that that championship will take place before the date until which Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1767, is applicable, that is to say, 15 March 2024. In that regard, further, having regard to the proximity in time between the date of the hearing in the main action, that is to say, 5 December 2023, and the date on which the Asian Le Mans Series ends, it is plausible that the judgment in the main action will not be delivered before the end of that championship.

95 It is appropriate to add that it is common ground between the parties that a certain number of championships other than Formula 1 may prove relevant for the renewal of the applicant’s Super Licence. For example, that appears to be the case of the FIA World Endurance Championship for which the applicant had been considered as a potential driver for a motor sport team, as is apparent from the letter of 24 June 2023, which he produced as an annex to his application for interim measures referred to in paragraph 87 above. The Council also appears to acknowledge, in its observations on the letter of 6 December 2023, that the applicant’s participation in the Asian Le Mans Series or the Fanatec GT World Challenge could make it possible for the applicant, depending on his position, to obtain points for the renewal of his Super Licence.

96 Moreover, even if the applicant’s participation in championships such as the Asian Le Mans Series, the Italian Gran Turismo or the Fanatec GT World Challenge Europe would not allow him to obtain points for the renewal of his Super Licence, it does allow him to continue his career as a professional motor sport driver in other championships. The significance of that participation in continuing his career is shown by the fact that, in the letter of 6 December 2023 referred to in paragraph 88 above, the motor sport team in question refers expressly to the applicant’s ‘impressive performance’ in the Asian Le Mans Series races a few days beforehand.

97 Thus, in the absence of the suspension sought and having regard to the potential duration of the proceedings in the main action, the possibility of the applicant resuming, at the end of the main proceedings, his career as a Formula 1 driver, which very often requires his presence in the European Union, in particular in order to participate in the Grand Prix, appears to be remote or, at the very least, severely limited.

98 In the fourth place, it must be held that the damage consisting in depriving the applicant of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships would be irreparable.

99 The applicant’s period of potential activity up to the date of the Court’s decision on the substance of the case will elapse irremediably. Accordingly, the resulting damage for him will become definitive and any financial compensation will not restore him to the situation that prevailed before he suffered the damage. Consequently, as the applicant submits, no compensation will be able to restore that non-pecuniary damage in the present case.

100 In the fifth place, it must be borne in mind that, should the requested suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures be granted by the present order, the applicant, as a Russian national, will be able to enter and reside in the European Union solely under the conditions laid down by a visa that might be granted by the competent authorities of a Member State. The Council’s argument that the applicant seeks to obtain, by his application for interim measures, protection of a right that he does not enjoy within the EU legal order must therefore be rejected.

101 Having regard to all the foregoing, it must be held that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied in the present case, since the likelihood of serious and irreparable damage occurring has been established to the requisite legal standard.

102 It is settled case-law that, in weighing up the different interests involved, the judge hearing the application for interim relief has to determine, in particular, whether or not the interest of the party seeking suspension of operation of the contested measure in securing that suspension outweighs the interest in the immediate application of the measure, by examining, more specifically, whether the possible annulment of the measure by the Court when ruling on the main application would allow the situation that would be brought about by its immediate implementation to be reversed and, conversely, whether suspension of operation of the measure would prevent it from being fully effective in the event of the main action being dismissed (see order of 11 March 2013, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑110/12 R, EU:T:2013:118, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

103 As regards more particularly the condition that the legal situation created by an interim relief order must be reversible, it must be recalled that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is merely to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision on the substance of the case. Consequently, that procedure is merely ancillary to the main action to which it is an adjunct, and accordingly the decision made by the court hearing an application for interim relief must be provisional in the sense that it cannot either prejudge the future decision on the substance of the case or render it illusory by depriving it of practical effect (see order of 1 September 2015, Pari Pharma v EMA, T‑235/15 R, EU:T:2015:587, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

104 It must therefore be examined whether the applicant’s interests in obtaining the immediate suspension of the September 2023 measures outweigh the interests pursued by the Council in adopting those measures.

105 As regards the interests pursued by the applicant, he claims that the possible annulment of the September 2023 measures by the Court at the end of the dispute in the main proceedings would not allow the situation resulting from their immediate implementation to be reversed. The non-pecuniary damage caused to his professional career would become definitive in respect of the time elapsing from the date when the restrictive measures took effect until the date of the decision in the main proceedings. Furthermore, as regards the period of activity potentially remaining after the decision in the main proceedings, it would be hardly realistic to consider that he could return to Formula 1, and even to Formula 2 or to Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters, if he had to wait for the judgment on the substance to be delivered. Consequently, it would be impossible for him to compete or follow training programmes also during the 2023 and 2024 seasons.

106 Moreover, the applicant submits that, from the perspective of the Council’s interest, first, suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures would not impede the objectives which it pursues in the event that the action in the main proceedings is dismissed, since he is not seeking, in particular, the provisional unfreezing of all his funds or economic resources, but only the suspension of the September 2023 measures to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment, to participate in the next motor sport championships and to pursue his professional career. Second, the applicant claims that the interim measures sought would not jeopardise the objectives pursued by the European Union through Decision 2023/1767 and Implementing Regulation 2023/1765, since he is a professional racing driver who is not involved in any Russian business, who has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional athlete, who raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 season of Formula 1 and who confirms being ready to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.

107 The Council retorts that the weighing up of interests lies in favour of not suspending the operation of the September 2023 measures. In the first place, the granting of the interim measures applied for would lead to serious and irreparable damage for the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pursued by the restrictive measures laid down in Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014. In the second place, granting of those measures would undermine the credibility of the CFSP measures taken to maintain and increase collective pressure on Russia, which is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, in clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations. In the third place, since restrictive measures are one of the most powerful tools available to the Council to implement the CFSP, depriving that instrument of its effect has a direct impact on the efficacy of the CFSP.

108 As regards the weighing up of interests, it should be noted that, so far as the applicant’s interest is concerned, it follows from paragraphs 97 and 99 above that the annulment of the September 2023 measures will not allow the situation resulting from their immediate implementation to be reversed, because the non-pecuniary damage will have become definitive as regards the applicant’s period of potential activity up to the date of the decision on the substance of the case and, on that date, it will be extremely difficult or even impossible for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver.

109 Consequently, should the applicant succeed in having the September 2023 measures annulled in the context of the main proceedings, any damage which he may have suffered as a result of the harm to his interests cannot subsequently be assessed and made good or compensated.

110 As far as the Council is concerned, the interests relied on are public interests that aim to protect European security and stability and form part of an overall strategy seeking to put an end to the aggression suffered by Ukraine as soon as possible.

111 In the light of the paramount importance of the objectives pursued by the September 2023 measures, namely the protection of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, which fall within the wider objective of maintaining international peace and security, it is necessary to examine whether the immediate suspension of the September 2023 measures, in so far as those measures concern the applicant, would threaten the European Union’s pursuit of the objectives, in particular peaceful objectives, which it has set for itself in accordance with Article 3(1) and (5) TEU, at the price, each day, of irreparable material and non-material damage.

112 As is apparent from paragraphs 41 to 77 above, there are, at this stage, reasons to doubt that the measures by which the restrictive measures were maintained against the applicant have a sufficiently solid factual basis and, more specifically, that the various items of evidence provided by the Council are such as to substantiate the fact that the applicant is associated with his father and that he benefited or continues to benefit from him.

113 Furthermore, the applicant claimed, without being challenged by the Council on that point, that he is not involved in any Russian business, has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional sportsman, raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 season of Formula 1 and is ready to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.

114 It must therefore be held that the applicant is in no way involved in the aggression suffered by Ukraine and is not engaged in any activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. He merely asks that he be given the opportunity to pursue his career as a motor sport driver, in Formula 1 in particular, without the financial support of his father.

115 Lastly, since the applicant seeks suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures, in so far as they concern him, only to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment, to participate in the next motor sport championships and to pursue his professional career, it must be acknowledged that, in those circumstances, suspension of the operation of those measures will not prejudge the future decision in the main proceedings or compromise the very purpose of the procedure for interim relief, which is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision in the main action.

116 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the weighing up of interests lies in favour of the applicant.

117 In that connection, suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures, in so far as they concern the applicant, must be limited to what is strictly necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union. To that end, the applicant is authorised only (i) to enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of his father or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, (ii) to enter the European Union in order to participate as a full, reserve or test driver in Formula 1 championships of the FIA or in other motor sport championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence, (iii) to enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team, (iv) to enter the European Union to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions, including on a simulator, (v) to enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors, (vi) to open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses and benefits from his race team can be paid to him, and (vii) to use the bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union, and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions.

118 Should he be recruited as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, the applicant must race under a neutral flag and sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for that purpose.

119 It follows from all the foregoing that the application for suspension of operation of the September 2023 measures must be granted to that extent. Moreover, it is not appropriate to grant the interim measures applied for in the applicant’s third and fourth heads of claim, since they do not appear to be necessary to give the useful effect sought to the suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures. The application for interim measures is therefore rejected as to the remainder, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the applicant’s third head of claim.

120 As the present order closes the interim proceedings, it is appropriate to cancel the order of 3 October 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R III and T‑743/22 R IV, not published), adopted pursuant to Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure, by which the President of the General Court ordered, under certain conditions, the suspension of the operation of the September 2023 measures and of the letter of 15 September 2023, in so far as they concern the applicant, until the date of the order terminating the present proceedings for interim measures.

121 Under Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.

1. The operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine is suspended in so far as the name of Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by those restrictive measures and only to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union. To that end, Mr Mazepin is authorised only (i) to enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, (ii) to enter the European Union in order to participate as a full, reserve or test driver in Formula 1 championships of the International Automobile Federation (FIA) or in other motor sport championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence, (iii) to enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team, (iv) to enter the European Union to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions, including on a simulator, (v) to enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors, (vi) to open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses and benefits from his race team can be paid to him, and (vii) to use that bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union, and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions.

Should he be recruited as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place solely or partly in the European Union, Mr Mazepin must race under a neutral flag and sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for that purpose.

3. The order of 3 October 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R III and T‑743/22 R IV, not published), is cancelled.

Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)