United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

 

Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/08598/2016

 

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

 

 

Heard at Birmingham	Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On 18 August 2017	On 28 March 2018

 

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

 

 

Between

 

MOHAMMED [H]

(anonymity direction not made)

Appellant

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

 

 

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr Sharif of Fountain Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr S Kotas Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

 

ERROR OF LAW FINDING AND REASONS

1.              This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Matthews promulgated on 16 March 2017 in which the Judge dismissed the appellant's appeal on both protection and human rights grounds.

2.              The appellant sought permission to appeal which was refused by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal but granted on a renewed application by a judge of the Upper Tribunal on the basis the grounds argue with merit that the Judge ought to have applied the country guidance of AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 544 and considered whether the appellant could reasonably relocate to Baghdad.

3.              The respondent in the Rule 24 response accepts the Judge was incorrect to find the appellant was from the IKR but submitted the error was not material for the appellant is an ethnic Kurd who has an internal relocation option to the IKR.

4.              It was accepted before the Upper Tribunal that such option would have to be exercised via Baghdad in accordance with AA which the Judge had clearly failed to consider in the decision under challenge.

5.              I find the Judge has erred for the reasons set out in the grant of permission by the Upper Tribunal. Factual findings made were not disputed.

6.              It was agreed with the advocates that the sole issue on which further consideration is required is that relating to internal relocation, in relation to which both parties agreed to provide written submissions in anticipation that the Upper Tribunal will be able to remake the decision on the basis of such written argument if no further hearing was required. If further oral evidence/submissions were required appropriate listing directions would be given.

7.              Written submissions were received from both parties, from the respondent dated 29 August 2017 and from the appellant's representatives dated 13 September 2017 in light of which the Upper Tribunal finds it is able to proceed to consider the matter further with a view to remaking the decision to either allow or dismiss the appeal on the papers without the need for a Resumed oral hearing.

Discussion

8.              It is not disputed the appellant is an Iraqi Kurd who was born and lived in Bartella, said to be a small town about 35 miles by car from Mosul. It is not disputed between the parties this does not fall within the IKR and therefore the appellant's initial point of return is to Baghdad.

9.              The Judge records the appellants case relied upon before the First-tier Tribunal at [14 (i) - (vii)] of that decision which I set out below for ease of reference:

"14. The account before me for the present appeal was that: -

i)                The appellant is an Iraq Kurd. He was born and lived in Bartella, a small town about thirty-five minutes by car from Mosul. The appellant's father died when the appellant was very young, the appellant was living with his mother prior to leaving Iraq.

ii)              In August 2014 the appellant was taken from his home by ISIS. He was held for approximately 2 to 3 months. He was taken away in a blindfold; he and others were forced to dig graves and trenches for ISIS whilst being held securely every night.

iii)            ISIS identified the appellant as a Muslim and so treated him slightly better than others.

iv)           He was finally able to escape when guards were distracted by an explosion. The appellant and another fled, his companion was sadly shot, but the appellant escaped and sought help after running to a nearby property.

v)             The appellant received help, and a lift to the town in which an uncle lived. He stayed there for some months but did not return home. He learnt that his mother could no longer be found and the family home seemed to have been destroyed by ISIS.

vi)           Eventually the appellant was helped by his uncle to pay an agent who brought him to the UK. He did not apply in any other countries as he travelled through Europe because he did not know the procedure for such an asylum claim.

vii)         The appellant has not been in contact with his mother or uncle since he has been in the United Kingdom."

10.          The Judge notes that the appellant was asked about travel and identity documents and indicated ISIS took his National Identity Card that he had with him when he was abducted but that he had an Iraqi Citizenship Card with him when he arrived in the United Kingdom. Although the appellant has the Citizenship Card with him when he was abducted by ISIS, they never took the card from him. The appellant also informed the Judge he had an Iraqi passport which he claimed to have left in Iraq when abducted.

11.          At [26 - 27] the Judge makes the following findings which are preserved: -

"26. When I view all of the above matters in the round, I do not find that the appellant, even to the lower standard of proof, has satisfied me that he was abducted as claimed. I find no basis to suggest that he has been held as claimed by ISIS. I note in any event that the appellant himself accepted that even on his own account he was not being targeted individually by ISIS, he was simply a young man that was swept up in their activities. At question 49 his substantive interview he spoke of ISIS simply taking everybody, and not targeting him individually.

27. The matters set out above, when viewed collectively and in the context of the entirety of the evidence in this case, are matters that in my judgment drive me to find that the appellant's account is lacking in credibility."

12.          The appellant is therefore no more than a failed asylum seeker from Iraq whose claim to have been abducted by ISIS, during the course of which he had his National Identity Card taken, has been shown to lack any degree of credibility. Similarly, as the First-tier Tribunal rejected the appellant's account this must include the appellants claim that he had not spoken to his uncle since leaving Iraq and/or that he had no family support available to him in his home country. This is therefore an appellant who, even if he left Iraq at the time ISIS moved into his home area, was of no adverse interest to them, has been issued with an Iraq Citizenship Card, National Identity Card, and passport, and who has an uncle, mother, and possibly a family home available in Iraq.

13.          The country guidance relating to return to Iraq is that currently in force following the decision of the Court of Appeal in AA (Iraq) v SSHD and SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 944 . The Court found that the existing country guidance should be revised by consent so as to read: (i) Return of former residents of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) will be to the IKR and all other Iraqis will be to Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will allow an Iraqi national (P) in the United Kingdom to enter Iraq only if P is in possession of a current or expired Iraqi passport relating to P, or a laissez passer; (ii) No Iraqi national will be returnable to Baghdad if not in possession of one of these documents; (iii) In the light of the Court of Appeal's judgment in HF (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1276, an international protection claim made by P cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a laissez passer, if the Tribunal finds that P's return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents; (iv)Where P is returned to Iraq on a laissez passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport. However (v), regardless of the feasibility of P's return, it will be necessary to decide whether P has a CSID, or will be able to obtain one, reasonably soon after arrival in Iraq. A CSID is generally required in order for an Iraqi to access financial assistance from the authorities; employment; education; housing; and medical treatment. If P shows there are no family or other members likely to be able to provide means of support, P is in general likely to face a real risk of destitution, amounting to serious harm, if, by the time any funds provided to P by the Secretary of State or her agents to assist P's return have been exhausted, it is reasonably likely that P will still have no CSID.

14.          It is not disputed that the appellant will not be able to automatically enter the IKR initially but will have to return to Baghdad.

15.          In AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC) (unchanged by the Court of Appeal) it was held that (i) As a general matter, it will not be unreasonable or unduly harsh for a person from a contested area to relocate to Baghdad City or (subject to comments in this case on humanitarian protection and areas of the country where there is an internal armed conflict) the Baghdad Belts; (ii) In assessing whether it would be unreasonable/unduly harsh for an Iraqi national (P) to relocate to Baghdad, the following factors are, however, likely to be relevant:(a) whether P has a CSID or will be able to obtain one (b) whether P can speak Arabic (those who cannot are less likely to find employment); (c) whether P has family members or friends in Baghdad able to accommodate him; (d) whether P is a lone female (women face greater difficulties than men in finding employment); (e) whether P can find a sponsor to access a hotel room or rent accommodation; (f) whether P is from a minority community; (g) whether there is support available for P bearing in mind there is some evidence that returned failed asylum seekers are provided with the support generally given to IDPs. (iii) there is not a real risk of an ordinary civilian travelling from Baghdad airport to the southern governorates, suffering serious harm en route to such governorates so as engage Article 15(c).

16.          The written submissions made behalf of the Secretary of State which preceded those made by the respondent are in the following terms:

"Respondents Written Submissions

1.              The Respondent makes these written submissions pursuant to the directions issued by the Upper Tribunal at the error of law hearing on 18 August 2017. The SSHD contends that the FTTJ's primary findings of fact, and in particular its findings in relation to the issues of credibility have not been successfully challenged and that these ought to stand. The decision of FTTJ is only set aside in relation to its assessment of the viability of internal relocation.

 

Internal Relocation

 

2.              The SSHD contends that FTTJ Matthews made certain adverse findings of fact that are fatal to any claim by the appellant that internal relocation would not be a viable option for the appellant and would be unduly harsh. The issue of internal relocation must be assessed in light of these findings of fact.

 

3.              The SSHD accepts the appellant comes from a contested area and as such the appellant will be returned to Baghdad. The SSHD contends that in light of the Court of Appeals decision in AA(Iraq) [2017], which amended the extant country guidance case of AA (Article 15 (c)) (Rev 2) [2015], the tribunal must assess whether A has a CSID be able to obtain one reasonably soon after his arrival in Iraq.

 

4.              The SSHD contends the burden of proof in this respect is upon A and the findings of fact made by the FTTJ show the appellant has been inherently incredible in relation to the core of his claim and reasons for leaving Iraq. Indeed the FTJ made various adverse credibility findings which ultimately led him to conclude " in my judgment drive me to find that the appellant's account is lacking in credibility" [27].

 

5.              Indeed the FTJ makes specific findings in relation to documentation, namely that the appellant had a citizenship card (which apparently ISIS allowed him to keep) [20], and critically, that he had an Iraqi passport but claimed to have left it in Iraq when abducted [21]. The aforementioned findings, coupled with the FTJ's rejection of the core of the appellants claim, including the implausibility of failing to call his uncle to let him know that he had arrived safely in the UK (given the significant expenditure to get him here [22&23]), inevitably leads to the conclusion that the appellant hasn't demonstrated he will not be able to get hold of this passport or have it sent to him.

 

6.              This is relevant because in AA (Iraq) [2015] the UT at [173] found that having a current or expired passport was one of the ways one can obtain a CSID from the Consular Section of the Iraqi Embassy in London. Simply therefore, the SSHD contends the appellant can obtain his passport and thereby obtain a CSID in London which will enable him to live and work in Baghdad. The SSHD contends that in accordance with BA (Returns to Baghdad) [2017], the UT has reiterated the levels of violence in Baghdad do not cross the Article 15 (c) level.

 

7.              The appellant is a single, healthy adult male with no dependents, who in his Asylum Screening Interview (Respondent's bundle A2), disclosed he is 50% fluent in Arabic and that he worked as a floor tile/labourer so clearly has a skill or trade behind him. The appellant could therefore obtain work in Baghdad and internal relocation could not in all the circumstances be described as unduly harsh. The SSHD also contends that possession of a CSID is only necessary if an appellant is able to demonstrate that they have no other means of other financial family support. In the extant case the appellant has clearly had financial assistance from his uncle. Given the acceptance of this fact, coupled with his general lack of credibility - the appellant has therefore not shown he has no family who could meet him or are indeed already present in Baghdad to provide him with shelter, accommodation and subsistence. Mere lack of CSID (which the SSHD disputes the appellant has demonstrated in any event) is not enough to found a claim for humanitarian protection.

 

8.              In the alternative, the SSHD contends the appellant would be able to internally relocate to the IKR from Baghdad. The Tribunal is invited to adopt the same adverse credibility findings above in this assessment too. Indeed FFTJ Matthews found the appellant will have some family support in the IKR [28].

 

9.              The SSHD contends that the appellant as a Kurd, and in line with the guidance contained in AA Iraq (2015) will be allowed entry clearance for ten days as a visitor and if he finds employment will be able to remain for longer. The SSHD also contends that in line with the CG that there is no evidence the IKR authorities proactively remove Kurds from the IKR whose permits have come to an end. The SSHD contends the appellant for the same reasons as above, has not shown he will be unable to gain employment. Again, the appellant speaks Kurdish and is a healthy adult male with family support to return to.

 

10.          The SSHD contends and asked the Upper Tribunal to judicially note that there are daily flights from Baghdad to the IKR which are not prohibitively expensive (especially not so for an appellant who has already spent thousands of dollars on a journey to the UK) ¹. Internal relocation is therefore clearly viable and in all the circumstances cannot be described as unduly harsh.

 

11.          Accordingly the UT is invited to dismiss the appellant's appeal on all grounds.

 

^1.       Results from search on Skyscanner.net performed on 29 August 2017 reveals direct flights from Baghdad to Erbil from £108 1-way for 31 August 2017.

17.          The appellant's written submissions read as follows:

"Appellants written submissions

1.              The Appellant makes these submissions to the directions made by the Upper Tribunal on 18 August 2017 when it was found that there was an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge's findings that the Appellant was a Kurdish citizen from the IKR and that there was no bar to return to the IKR.

 

2.              The decision was set aside in relation to the assessment of the viability of internal relocation. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant came from the area of Mosul, a contested area and as such, will be returned to Baghdad.

 

3.              The crucial question is whether such return would be feasible because the Appellant does not have any documents. His Iraqi passport was left in Iraq when he was abducted by ISIS who took his National Identity Card although they allowed him to keep his Citizenship Card which he no longer has. The further separate issue is whether the Appellant could obtain a CSID either from the Iraq Embassy in London because he held an Iraqi passport, thereby enabling him to return to Baghdad or obtain the same in Baghdad.

 

4.              The Respondent argues that the Appellant could obtain a CSID and that it would not be unreasonable or unduly harsh to relocate to Baghdad or alternatively that he could internally relocate to the IKR from Baghdad because as a Kurd he would be allowed to enter for 10 days as a visitor and if he found employment, would be able to remain for a longer period.

 

5.              The Appellant relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in AA (Iraq) [2017] EWCA Civ 944 in respect of the judgment relating to the substantive appeal and the Annex at Part B regarding documentation and feasibility return (excluding IKR) and Part C regarding the CSID as well as Part D regarding internal relocation within Iraq (other than the IKR) and Part E regarding the Iraqi Kurdish region.

 

6.              Paragraph 170 of the Upper Tribunal's decision in AA (Article 15 (c) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 544 had to be read in light of and consistently with the amended guidance in AA (2017). Regardless of the feasibility of a person's return to Iraq, it is necessary to decide whether that person had a CSID or be able to obtain one reasonably soon after arrival in Iraq. The Upper Tribunal had equated the CSID to a return document which was wrong. Without a passport or laissez passer a person could not be returned to Iraq. Since such return was not feasible, there would be no risk of a breach of Article 3. The position with a CSID was different. It was not merely a document used to achieve entry to Iraq but it was essential to access food and basic services. A CSID could not automatically be acquired after return to Iraq.

 

7.              In the refusal letter at paragraph 44, the Respondent stated that because of AA (2015), the Appellant could not produce a current expired passport or laissez passer and therefore could not be returned to Baghdad and he could not produce a CSID to obtain such a document. The Respondent stated that return to Iraq was not currently feasible.

 

8.              However, at paragraph 45, the Respondent stated that the Appellant could apply for formal recognition of identity by the National Status Court in Baghdad and at paragraph 49, stated that he could return to Baghdad and travel onwards to the IKR. At paragraph 50, it was said that the Appellant will be able to obtain entry to the IKR for ten days and register for renewal. Paragraph 51, it was said that the Appellant could obtain a CSID. It was accepted at paragraph 36 that return to the Appellant's home area of Mosul would amount to a breach of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

 

9.              If the Appellant cannot be returned to Iraq because he is not in possession of a current expired passport a laissez passer, AA (2017) makes it clear he will not be returned to Baghdad. He will not be at risk on return because such return is not feasible. The Appellant would not be subjected to Article 3 treatment or entitled to humanitarian protection for this reason.

 

10.          On the other hand, whether the Appellant could acquire a CSID depends upon his ability to obtain one from the Civil Status Affairs Office in his home Government and this depends on whether he has a passport. If he does not have a passport, his ability to obtain a CSID may depend on whether he knows what information is contained in the book. In AA (2017), it was held that the ability to obtain a CSID is likely to be severely hampered if a person is unable to go to the Civil Status Affairs Office of his Governorate because it is an area where Article 15(c) Serious Harm is occurring. Since the Appellant comes from the Mosul area, alternative offices have been established in Baghdad but according to AA (2017), the evidence does not demonstrate that the "Central Archive" which exists in Baghdad is in practice able to provide CSID's to those in need of them. There is a National Status Court in Baghdad to which a person could apply for formal recognition of identity but the precise operation of this court is, however, unclear.

 

11.          Thus, it is submitted that it is entirely unclear and certain whether the Appellant could in fact even obtain a CSID reasonably soon after his arrival in Iraq, even if return is feasible. He is likely to be destitute in the absence of a CSID. He has lost contact with his uncle who lived in Mosul and realistically cannot rely on him or anyone else for support. His father was killed just before he was born and ISIS abducted his mother. He is from a minority community, namely Kurdish, he would not able to find accommodation or anyone to support him in Baghdad and he has no sponsor and is unlikely to find one. Part D of the Annexe in the amended country guidance of AA (2017) is relied upon at 15(a), (c), (e), (f) and (g) to support the fact that relocation to Baghdad will be unreasonable and unduly harsh.

 

12.          As to internal relocation to the IKR, the Appellant does not originate from the IKR. As a Kurd, he could obtain entry for ten days as a visitor but would then have renew permission for a further ten days. He may be able to remain longer if he can find employment. Although there is no evidence that the IKR authorities proactively remove Kurds from the IKR whose permits have come to an end, it is again entirely uncertain unclear whether the Appellant could obtain employment, this being purely speculative. He has no family or friends for support in the IKR. The Respondent suggested in the written submissions that the Appellant could travel from Baghdad by air to the IKR one-way ticket, costing the equivalent of £108 but this suggestion is simply ludicrous because the Appellant would not be in the position to raise such a large sum of money. Realistically, he would not be able to finance the lengthy journey from Baghdad. Internal relocation cannot be said to be clearly viable as the Respondent claimed. Part E of the Annex is relied upon particular at 20 (a), (b) and (c) to show that internal relocation to the IKR is unreasonable and unduly harsh.

 

13.          In conclusion, it is nonsensical for the Respondent to suggest that the Appellant could return to Baghdad and resume his life thereby finding gainful employment or alternatively relocate to the IKR. The Respondent stated that the Appellant would have family support in the IKR and that the FTT Judge found this to be the case. However, that finding was flawed at paragraph 28 of the decision because the Judge said the Appellant was from the IKR and had family support there when in fact he was from Mosul which the Respondent accepted.

 

14.          In light of the guidance given in AA(2017), it is submitted that the Appellant would not be able to return to Baghdad because he is not in possession of the current or expired Iraqi passport or a laissez passer. Regardless of the feasibility of the Appellants return, there is no reasonable likelihood that he will be able to obtain a CSID either from the Iraqi Embassy in London as the Respondent suggested or indeed in Iraq itself. Internal relocation either within Iraq or within the IKR is simply not practicable and it would be unreasonable and unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to be able to relocate for all the reasons set out above.

 

15.          The Tribunal is therefore invited to allow the appeal on the issue of relocation."

18.          As is the reality of life in Iraq, the situation has moved on considerably since the appellant left his home area. On 25 October 2016 a news item published by Al Jazeera records 'that the offensive to reclaim ISIL's last major urban bastion in Iraq enters second week, with fighting east and south of Mosul'. The article records that 'Iraqi forces fought their way into two villages near Mosul as the offensive to retake that city enters its second week and that Iraqi special forces began shelling ISIL positions before dawn on Monday near Bartella, a historically Christian town to the east of Mosul that they had retaken last week. After entering the village they allowed more than thirty people, who had been sheltering in the school, to escape the fighting'.

19.          This shows that the appellant's home area is now in the control of the government of Iraq as indeed is the whole of the Mosul area following further fighting after the date of the article; culminating in the defeat of ISIL in Iraq. It is accepted there is reference to occasional pockets of resistance but it is clear that all of this area, outside the recognised boundaries of the IKR, is now under the control of the government of Iraq.

20.          It is also the case that the fact the First-tier Tribunal Judge may have mistakenly thought that Mosul was in the IKR, or that because of the appellant's ethnicity he had a right of return directly to the IKR, does not mean the other adverse findings made are susceptible to challenge. The Upper Tribunal has found that the findings of fact made by the Judge shall stand which includes the finding of the availability of support from family members in Iraq. It is of course possible that such support exists within the IKR now as many who fled in advance by ISIL in areas such as Mosul sought safety from the Kurdish authorities in the IKR.

21.          It is not disputed that the appellant may find it difficult to settle in Baghdad as a result of his lack of a sponsor although language issues and employment opportunities are matters he has shown he might realistically be able to overcome on the basis of a knowledge of Arabic and transferable skill as a tiler. The term 'settle' refers to a more permanent status than that of a person visiting or passing through.

22.          In relation to documentation, the appellants claim regarding documents has been found not to be credible by the Judge. This specifically includes the claim that ISIL took his National Identity Card although leaving him with his Iraq Citizenship Card. As his claim to have been abducted by ISIL has been found to lack any credibility his claim his National Identity Card was taken by this group must also lack credibility. The Iraqi National Identity Card is very important as it replaced the Nationality Certificate Civil Identity document from 1 January 2016 and by 2018 will replace the Residency Card. The fact the appellant claims to have had a National Identity Card must mean that since the introduction of this document he was able to provide sufficient evidence to the Iraqi authorities to establish his entitlement to the same. The National Identity Card was first issued on 1 January 2016.

23.          The National Identity Card is connected to the Iraqi Civil System by way of an embedded chip with an individual's details recorded on the same. As the appellant has not established, on the basis of any credible evidence, to have lost his National Identity Card he cannot discharge the burden upon him to show that this document is not available or that he is undocumented. He does not claim it was left at home but claims it was in his possession before ISIL took the same. Possession of such document will therefore allow the Iraqi authorities to undertake the necessary identity checks from which the Embassy in London will be able to issue a replacement passport or laissez passer document. The card will also allow the appellant to access service in the same way as those possessing a CSID.

24.          I find it not made out that the appellant will not be able to return with relevant documentation, including a passport or temporary travel document, or that he is not able to obtain as CSID if one is indeed required as the National Identity Card is replacing the CSID as a means of identifying an individual and their entitlements.

25.          Those being returned to Iraq may also be entitled to the benefit of a Relocation Package from the respondent in addition to support from the authorities, similar to that paid to IDP's, on return. One such element of a Relocation Package of this nature is the provision of funds to assist with the costs of travel to a person home area.

26.          It is not made out that the appellant will not be able to obtain a domestic flight within Iraq to the IKR. The appellant has not expressly plead the same referring only to the cost of obtaining the required ticket.

27.          Even if a Relocation Package was not available it has not been made out that the appellant does not have support in Iraq from family members who will either be able to meet him on his return to Baghdad or to provide for him once he is able to fly to the IKR. It is not made out the family do not have adequate resources especially as it is claimed the appellant's uncle paid $6,000 to facilitate the appellant's journey to the United Kingdom.

28.          It is not made out the appellant has any adverse profile that would give rise to suspicion based upon his having lived in an area previously under the occupation of ISIS. The appellant has been in the United Kingdom and his presence here can be vouched for if required.

29.          It is not made out the appellant will not be able to enter the IKR. In relation to family support the appellant has family in Iraq. The appellant claimed not to be in contact with his family members but his evidence in relation to the core of his claim, which I find includes family contact, has been found to lack credibility. The claim to have no contact with family is not made out.

30.          I find it not made out that the appellant will be returned to the IKR as a person without family support from either his parent(s) or other family members. It is not made out that family support will not be available to assist the appellant in reintegrating into Iraq or to assist with the provision of accommodation and/or employment. As noted the appellant worked in Iraq as a floor tiler indicating he has a skill that should enable him to secure employment.

31.          The appellant is no more than a failed asylum seeker as found by the First-tier Tribunal. No real risk has been made out on return. The appellant has not established he has any adverse profile that will make him of interest to any of the authorities. It is not made out the appellant cannot be returned to Baghdad and fly from Baghdad to the IKR and secure entry. It is not made out the appellant will not have family support or assistance to enable him to re-establish himself either in the IKR or his home area if he is returned there by the Kurdish authorities. It is not made out the appellant will be undocumented.

32.          The burden of establishing an entitlement to international protection falls upon the person so alleging. I do not find the appellant has discharged the burden of proof upon him to the required standard to establish such an entitlement. It is accepted that with the upheaval that has occurred in Iraq the appellant may find matters difficult but this does not entitle a person to a grant of international protection per se.

Decision

33.          I remake the decision as follows. This appeal is dismissed

Anonymity.

34.          The First-tier Tribunal did not make an order pursuant to rule 45(4)(i) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005.

I make no such order pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

 

 

Signed.......................................................

Upper Tribunal Judge Hanson

 

Dated the 26 March 2018